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Abstract:  Capitalism  in  Argentina  underwent  some  important  transformations
between  the  neoliberal  era  (1975–2001)  and  the  new,  neodevelopmentalist  one
(2002–2015).  These changes conformed a new mode of  peripheral  participation of
Argentina’s economy that has novelties as well  as strong continuities,  where State
form and modes of intervention change. We’ll show how this project of development
reproduces,  in  a  new  context,  and  within  new  structural  and  subjective/political
conditions, the historical process of combined and uneven development in Argentina.
We propose to analyze such transformation, and assess their limitations for creating a
sustainable option for capitalist reproduction in Argentina. Our analysis will provide an
alternative  view  of  recent  capitalist  development  in  Argentina  that  combines  the
process of  class formation,  class struggle  and political  conflict,  with  the structural
tendencies of changing global capitalism.
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I. Introduction
Argentina went through several decades of neoliberal restructuration and in the early 2000s its crisis
led to a new process of renewed capital accumulation. All along, the struggle of classes operated as
the  engine  for  transformations.  During  the  last  decade,  class  conflict  materialized  in  a
reconfiguration  of  the  block  in  power  with  transnational  capital  acting  as  the  new hegemonic
fraction.  The  transformation  through  neoliberalism  was the  foundations  on  which  a  new
developmentalist strategy was built as a sociopolitical configuration meant to displace and channel
class antagonism on a productive path for capital.
This  article  attempts  to  discuss  this  process,  understanding  structural  transformations  and
continuities as the mediated result of class conflict. This means comprehending so-called economic
structure and the State as social forms resulting from class struggles, operating as mediations and
ground for its development.
In  the  following  section  we  analyze  how  changes  from  neoliberalism  into
neodevelopmentalism in Argentina can be understood in this light. Section three introduces us to
one significant element in the constitution of the neodevelopmentalist strategy. There we attempt to
analyze how the new hegemonic social project is based on particular sources of valorization such as
the super exploitation of labour and nature that have resulted from continued struggles through and
beyond neoliberalism. Finally, we present a discussion on how the former have come to articulate a
new form of dependency, which not only changes the nature of the cycle of capital in Argentina but
also creates  significant limits to the hegemonic project. We end the article with some conclusions
and references.
II. Argentina after Neoliberalism
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During  almost  25  years  Argentina  went  through  its  vernacular  neoliberal  stage  (Féliz  2012a).
Beginning in 1975 in the year before the last military coup, capitalist class pushed forward the most
radical,  violent  restructuration  of  social  relations  seen  in  Argentina’s  history.  In  an  attempt  to
change  the  correlation  of  social  forces  in  its  favor,  dominant  fractions  within  the  hegemonic
capitalist class were able to advance a new economic policy together with widespread repression of
popular organizations. At the same time, in a more or less disarticulate fashion, individual capitals
in every sector acted in an attempt to recreate the microeconomic conditions for valorization and
capitalist appropriation of value. On the side of labour, after repression and retreat during the first
years of the military government, working class was able to recover, attempting re-articulate itself
politically  to  confront  structural adjustment.  Most  of the eighties became the forefront  of class
struggle,  with  big  local  capitals,  financial  capital  and—increasingly—transnational  corporations
working their way through to break labour’s resistance. Growing stagnation and crisis, exploding
public finances and hyper inflation in the late eighties were finally able to break with the working
people’s  attempts  to  stave  off  the  final  stage  of  neoliberal  reorganization.  In  fact,  through the
nineties,  dominant classes were able to push forth (through and outside the State) a process of
liberalization, transnationalization and privatization of society as a whole. The ghost of the falling
of  the  Berlin  Wall,  the  Washington  Consensus  (WC)  and  Thatcher’s  “There  is  no  alternative”
(TINA) was able to create the necessary atmosphere for neoliberalism to move forward in Argentina
more than any other place in the region.
While neoliberalism, not as an “economic model” but as a process of transformations and
political project of the dominant classes, was successful in the end, crisis ridden capitalism in the
periphery again set the pace for a new era. Even if reforms were swift and deep in Argentina, class
struggle led to the overt crisis of neoliberal momentum and eventually its transcendence. In the
nineties, the completion of neoliberal transformations created significative structural tensions while
at the same time were not able to dismantle working class resistance. The program of the nineties
(dubbed “Convertibility plan”) created immense pressure on valorization of capital, mainly as it
pressed on the tendency for the profit  rate to fall  (Féliz 2007). Reorganization of capital  in its
different  forms  fueled  increasing  productivity  of  labour  but  at  the  cost  of  a  growing  organic
composition of capital. The pressure created turned into deflationary tensions, heightened as the
crises of the neoliberal project begun to circle about in the periphery (Mexico in 1995, Southeast
Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999). Resistance to neoliberal rule was picking up strength
as a process of political recomposing of the working people begun to consolidate in the late nineties
(Bonnet 2006). This combination was fatal for the neoliberal project in Argentina. Even if working
class  organization  and struggle  was  not  able  to  stall  the  neoliberal  reforms,  it  was  capable  of
disarticulating its political hegemony. As the Convertibility plan exploded in late 2001 after four
years of stagnation, a widespread crisis of organic nature, in Gramsci’s terms, led to a process of
heightened sociopolitical instability (Bonnet 2006).
Towards a New Hegemonic Alternative
A year of political and economic uncertainty was all it took for dominant fractions of capital to
recreated their ability to valorize. By early 2003, a new national government was transcending the
capitalist crisis and building new consensus around a capitalist development alternative. As the new
dominant fractions of capital (transnational) were coming to terms with a new economic policy
favorable  to  their  needs,  the  political  forces  in  the  power  of  the  State  (Kirchnerism,  a  new
hegemonic fraction within the traditional Peronist national-popular movement) was working out the
means to channel on institutional tracks demands from popular movements, while at the same time
dismissing the most radical proposals (Féliz 2012a).
The  constitution  of  a  new hegemonic  project  led  by  transnational  capital  implied  several
novelties. First, though the State, dominant fractions of capital were able to impose policies that
allowed them to pass on the costs of the transitional crisis to the lot of the working class (Féliz
2012a, 109).  In the first  year of the new stage they were able  to place a representative of big
industrial  capital  (José Ignacio De Mendiguren,  president  of the Industrial  Union of  Argentina,
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Unión  Industrial  Argentina—UIA)  as  the  head  of  the  new  Ministry  of  Industry.  Second,  as
accumulation of capital  picked on and conditions in the labour market improved (eg.,  growing
employment,  falling  unemployment),  working  class  militancy  from  below  and  from  within
traditional trade union structures was able to push on for a progressive but partial  recovery on
incomes and working conditions for a fraction of the working class (Féliz, 2012a: 111–12). Third, a
new set of social policies was set in place to contain and dismantle discontent of a great mass of
people that Argentina’s new development strategy would not be able to include (Féliz 2012a, 113–
15). Forth, a new economic policy set that attempted to create the framework for capital to take
advantage of the structural changes set forth through neoliberal reforms, while consolidating them
as structural characters of capital valorization and accumulation (Féliz 2015).
There’s been much debate as to nature of this new historical phase in Argentina. On the one
hand, discussion abounds as to whether changes were the mere result  of relatively autonomous
changes due to new political coalitions in the State (Varesi 2013). This view misplaces Poulantzas’
account  on  the  relative  autonomy  of  the  State  and  places  explanation  in  the  constitution  and
consolidation of a new political consensus within the new peronist governing coalition, first under
Eduardo Duhalde’s government (Jan. 2002–May 2003) and then Néstor Kirchner (May 2003–Dec.
2007)  and  Cristina  Fernández  de  Kirchner  (Dec.  2007-Dec.  2015).  Duhalde’s  transitional
government was able to place the foundations of a renewed political hegemony of capital and the
State as legitimate institution. The Kirchner’s worked hard to recreate a national-popular tradition
that sees development as the result of class compromise and the State as a means to obtain it. In this
configuration, economic growth and re-industrialization would work together to promote that bases
for social inclusion through salaried employment with the State operating as a complement for those
deemed unemployable (Pérez and Féliz 2010; Féliz 2012a, 2012b).
On the contrary, we understand that the new stage opens up the reconfiguration of the block in
power,  which  presents  big  transnational  capital  (BTC),  especially  its  industrial  fractions,  as
hegemonic within the dominant capitalist class. This new configuration displaces financial capital
to the side in terms of its ability to appropriate surplus value directly, after having played a key role
in the neoliberal stage easing privatizations and the restructuration of social capital. For some this
meant the end of the domination of “financial valorization.” To our understanding, while financial
capital played a significant role across neoliberalism, it worked always mainly as a means to forces
general capitalist restructuring (Féliz 2015, 79). In this new era, BTC were able to articulate a new
hegemonic block that could allow them to take advantage of the new social, technical and political
structure of capital created through neoliberalism. To do so, they had to acknowledge the existence
of  working  people  as  an  antagonist  force  within  capitalist  reproduction.  While  through
neoliberalism labour’s demands and actions were directly dismissed and repressed in the name of
“modernization,” in the new era capital had to recognize a new political composition of labour
(Féliz 2015, 78–79). This meant that accepting the need to incorporate partial demands in order to
dismantle  increased  political  radicalization.  This  attitude  was  able  to  channel  demands  from
organized labour through traditional institutions thus aborting novel actions by base workers, which
were keen on using direct action and non-institutional methods in their  struggles. Besides, new
social  organizations led by unemployed workers,  played a key role in forcing changes in State
policies since the early years of this era. Through their radical demands (“Que se vayan todos [They
all must go],” “Por trabajo, dignidad y cambio social [For work, dignity and social change]), these
movements put extreme pressure on the political  system (Dinerstein 2002) since they were not
subjects  of  regular  state  intervention and their  demands where presented  in  un-institutionalized
fashion  (road  blocks,  direct  action).  New  social  policies  had  to  be  instituted  to  contain  these
demands  and  through  “conflictive  normalization”  get  a  hold  of  the  more  radical  sides  of  the
movement, in an attempt to deactivate them (Dinerstein, Contartese and Deledicque 2010; Féliz
2012a, 109, 113–15).
Paradoxical Change: From Strong to Weak State Form
While  neoliberal  reforms  in  Argentina  were  successful  in  creating  a  new social,  political  and
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technical  organization  of  capital,  the  political  turmoil  in  the  transition  out  of  neoliberalism
transformed  the  bases  for  the  constitution  of  hegemony.  In  the  nineties,  the  hegemony  of  the
neoliberal project manifested—paradoxically—in a “strong” State, even while the political discourse
appealed to its “disappearance” (Féliz and Pérez 2004). This type of State was able to subdue both
capital and labor in an attempt to complete restructuration of society as a whole (Bonnet and Piva
2013). Economic policies eliminated most of the State’s instruments for intervention thus leaving
individual capitals to fight for themselves through the process of reorganization: deregulation of the
economy, unilateral liberalization of both trade and capital foreign accounts, “independence” of the
Central Bank, and “convertibility” of the national currency (currency board), left each individual
fraction  of  capital  to  itself  in  the  struggle  for  survival.  This  meant  that  eventually  only  big,
concentrated,  transnationalized capitals  would  emerge successful  in  the  end.  At  the same time,
deregulation of the labour market, privatization of social security and partial privatization of health
and education, where all means to put pressure on the working people. These policies accompanied
by  open  repression  of  social  struggles  and  protests,  completed  the  process  of  political
decomposition  of  the  labour  movement  in  the  early  nineties,  and  led  to  the  completion  of  its
reorganization of labour as variable capital. This included the precarization and flexibilization of
working conditions across the board.
The turbulent exit from neoliberalism in Argentina meant a radical change in the form of the
capitalist State, where we witnessed the transition to a weak State (Bonnet and Piva 2013). This was
the result of a change both in the strategy of capital and that of the working people. On the one
hand,  exiting  neoliberalism  meant  the  possibility  for  capital  to  begin  a  renewed  process  of
successful valorization and accumulation. This process would be based on a new constitution of the
ruling classes around BTC, a novel means for exploitation of labour and nature, and a changed
profile  of  international  relations  at  a  regional  and  global  level.  All  of  these  were  being  made
available due to successful capitalist restructuration during the long years of neoliberalism. These
novelties put the State in a different position regarding capital since most structural reforms were
finished,  public  policies  were  now  to  be  placed  in  a  different  light:  not  just  as  a  means  for
restructuring but as an instrument for favoring competition at a global scale (eg., competitiveness).
In terms of capitalist reproduction, the new State had to create the means for expanded reproduction
of capital in this new context, while at the same time being able to maintain hegemonic conditions
for BTC within the new power block. On the other hand, the new posneoliberal State had to be able
to contain social struggles within the boundaries of valorization of capital in a still dependent value
space.  As stated before,  this meant the need to take actions to incorporate some demands from
working classes while attempting to dismantle more radical, anti-capitalist struggles. This new form
of the State no longer appears “detached” from class struggle but it appears as it is, a place of
condensation of class forces and struggles (Clarke 1992). As a form of capital as a social relation,
the  State  is  now  weaker,  overtly  permeated  by  the  political  blows  from  the  social  arena.
Paradoxically,  the  political  forces  in  this  State  appear  as  “populist”  for  they  present  a  more
“distributive” discourse and show a more openly political intervention. While the neoliberal Strong
State´s action meant creating more rigid rules (as a form of expression of capital domination over
society), this new Weak State operates as a dispenser of rights and riches (preferring the use of
“discretionary policy” over “rules”), as a result of the heightened level of political contradictions in
struggles. Even if this seems as if the political force at the top of the State is more progressive (in
the case of Argentina,  Kirchnerism),  the fact is that “progressive” policies express the changed
relations amongst classes not mere political will. Since this change is only moderate in Argentina,
and social hegemony remains within the capitalist class, barriers and limits of such progressiveness
became evident soon.
As the new State form still represents the social hegemony of capital, now in its transnational
form, public policies articulate to promote the competitive needs of capital within the framework of
a  dependent  capitalist  economy.  These  policies  combine  a  new  macroeconomic  policy,  with
infrastructure expenditures and subsidies to capital  in an attempt to exploit  and consolidate the
structural conditions created through neoliberalism and to recreate them in new ways (Féliz 2015).
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III. Accumulation by  Dispossession,  Super  Exploitation of  Labour and
Nature, and Extraordinary Rents
The process of valorization after 2002 was jump started through a huge redistribution of value and
income, which was made possible with a new economic policy and a new form of the State to
accommodate changes in the political composition of classes. However, valorization was based not
simply on the redistribution of value but also in new ways of producing surplus value. These new
ways were developed from within neoliberalism and expanded afterwards.
Argentina consolidated in this new stage as a producer-supplier of primary commodities. These
commodities accrue ground (or extraordinary) rents (ER) and thus are a source of additional surplus
value.  ER are  created  though  a  combination  of  particular  natural  conditions  that  facilitate  the
production  of  certain  commodities,  with  particular  technologies  and a  structure  of  demand for
producing and selling those commodities, respectively (Féliz 2014). Argentina has always been a
producer of primary products such as wheat, maize, and meat (Arceo 2003). Since the early nineties
Argentina  began introducing  new transgenic  seeds  that  combined  with  other  technological  and
social changes, created the adequate bases for the expansion of other foods stuffs such as Soya. A
similar situation occurred with mining commodities such as gold (Svampa and Sola Álvarez 2010).
While mineral deposits created the objective conditions for production, only the development of
new technologies  and changed legislation were able to  turn the potential  into possible.  In both
cases, a change in global demand conditions tilted the situation into actual productive potential and
consequently into the production of higher flows of ER. In Marxian terms, we might say that a
violent transition from Type I to Type II ground rent was being produced (Féliz 2014). In food stuffs
production as well as in mineral extraction, rent generation depends on increasing expenditures of
constant capital in the form of massive machinery and increasing investment in circulating capital;
both open-pit mining and “modern” agricultural production depend heavily on the use of chemicals.
This can only be done in a context of much higher prices for these commodities, a situation that was
recently favoured by commodity price speculation and the irruption of new value spaces, such as
China and India, in the world market. In the background, the expansion of rent accruing productions
operates on the bases of a massive process of some form of accumulation by dispossession or land
grabbing (Constantino 2014; Svampa and Sola Álvarez, 2010). Through a variety of mechanisms,
capital is displacing original settlers, users or proprietors (private or public) from the land turning
the territory into a place for the valorization of capital. In most cases, this process involves some
form  of  direct  or  indirect  violence,  in  general  with  the  mediation  of  the  State  to  favor  the
capitalization of the territories.
In as much as ER from natural resources expanded creating a fabulous source of surplus value
for capital’s valorization (Kennedy 2014), neoliberalism had left the seeds for a parallel source for
extraordinary profitability:  super exploitation of labour.  According to Marini (1973),  this  is  the
generalization of a form of exploitation of labour that speeds up the degradation of the labour force
by paying wages that are well below its social cost of reproduction (eg., below its value). This is the
result  of the nature of capitalist  reproduction in a dependent country´s value-space.  Since most
capitals lag behind in terms of their ability to compete in the global cycle of capital, they attempt to
compensate their lack of productivity through the use of precarization of labour conditions as a
means to induce super exploitation (Féliz 2015, 83).
Super  exploitation  of  labour  has  been  a  historical  condition  for  dependent  countries,
particularly in Latin America (Marini 1973). In the case of Argentina, the constitution of a strong
labour  movement  created  a  significant  force  against  the  intensification  of  these  process  of
extraordinary exploitation well into the seventies (Féliz and Pérez 2004). Only through neoliberal
rule was capital able to expand these conditions, as the political decomposition of the working class
was forced through its fragmentation by the way of outsourcing, subcontracting and flexibilization
of labour regulations. This means that class struggle develops in a context that imperiled the ability
for unified action of the working people and thus favoring an increasing division and stratification
of  working  situations.  As  this  generalized  in  the  nineties,  and  consolidated  in  the
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neodevelopmentalist era, super exploitation became a significative source of extraordinary surplus
value  and  profits.  Even  as  labour  market  conditions  improved  somewhat  after  the  crisis  of
neoliberalism  and  as  a  new  form  of  the  State  came  into  being,  structural  conditions  for  the
reproduction of the working people remained prone to super exploitation (Féliz 2015, 82–83).
As a matter of fact, we might say that the cycle of capital in Argentina in the current stage requires
the super exploitation of both labour and nature. In both cases, the “resource” is used up as fast as
possible  with  little  regard  for  the  social  and  environmental  cost.  The  private  cost  of  the
expropriation of both value and use values for the expanded reproduction of capital within global
commodity chains,  is  far  less than the actual  cost  for the working people and the Pachamama
(mother  nature)  in  terms  of  both  sustainability  and  the  creation  of  conditions  for  good  living
(Buenvivir). Never before was super exploitation so central in the expanded reproduction of capital
in Argentina.
IV. Old Dependency, New Dependencies
This  novel  way  to  articulate  the  reproduction  of  capital  within  Argentina’s  value-space  is  not
isolated  from the  place  dominant  classes  have  been able  to  gain  for  themselves  within  global
expanded  reproduction  in  the  era  of  transnational  capital.  Through  neoliberalism,  concentrated
capital was able to rebuild its hegemony over society (Féliz 2015). This required both the creation
of  a  new  structure  of  domination  within  the  capitalist  class  and  between  classes.  Within  the
capitalist class, transnational fractions were able to definitely displace competing national capitals
from the dispute over social strategy. The domestic capital’s strategy to act as an associate partner to
foreign multinational capital (to paraphrase Cardoso and Magnani, 1974) gave place to a situation
where transnational capital occupies dominant positions in every branch of industry.
In  this  new venue,  changes  in  the  social  division  of  capital  mimics  changes  in  the  way
dependency is produced and reproduced within Argentina’s cycle of capital. Before neoliberalism,
Argentina had been placed as a solid peripheral local market for commodities (Basualdo 2006)
while at the same time being a provider of certain productions for the world market (Arceo 2003).
Labour struggles for better income had been able to create a sizable demand for basic consumption
goods. At the same time the historical dependency of Argentina’s economy on its relationship with
the European countries (EU) and the United States (US), in terms of exports of primary products
from agriculture in exchange for imports of machinery, created a significant limit to the possibility
of  actual  capitalist  development.  This  created,  however,  considerable  room for  local,  national
capital  based  manufacturing  for  essential  goods  with  multinational  corporations  occupying
significative,  and  growing,  places  in  some constant  capital  intensive  branches.  In  parallel,  this
limited the possibilities of actual development to the ability to generate world currency through
exports to finance growing imports.
Changes through neoliberalism and its consolidation in neodevelopmentalism, have pushed a
transformation in the partners for dependency. The old US and EU based dependency gave place to
a new form. Behind the new imperialism, a number of sub-imperial nations thrived; for Argentina,
especially Brazil and China. These new powers in the global south, came to increasingly dominate
the cycle of capital  in Argentina’s territory.  Brazil  through its  determinant role in the Common
Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur, Mercosur) created in the late eighties. China, for its
part, has become one of Argentina’s fastest growing markets, and today represents one of its most
important  trade partners.  Exports  to Brazil,  China (and India)  represented 31.6 percent  of total
exports of Argentina in 2010 (only 24.9 percent in 2002), while imports from those countries rose
from 32.7 percent in 2002 to 45.8 percent in 2010 (Féliz 2015, 83).
Historically  the  dependence  of  Argentina’s  cycle  of  capital  was  tied  to  exporting  primary
agricultural commodities to Europe and the US, both open competitors in this products; besides,
these  countries  have  always  protected  their  agricultural  producers.  At  the  same  time,  those
economic  areas  became developed—in  the  capitalist  sense  of  the  word—early  in  the  twentieth
century.  Thus,  competition on manufacturing production was based mainly in their  productivity
advantage and their ability to generate innovations, which gave capital in those spaces the ability to
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gain extra profitability based on monopoly power. Part of the additional profitability in the center is
in fact a deduction or loss for peripheral countries through trade (Marini 1973). The response from
peripheral capitals was to push forward super exploitation to compensate for the loss of value and
surplus value thus produced (Marini 1973).
This articulation was the historical example of dependency and its consequences in Marini’s
account. Nowadays, Argentina’s dependent relationships have been transformed. In the ties with
Brazil, Argentina has sealed its fate to the development of the automobile industry, which has grown
as a bi-national manufacturing complex (Guevara 2011). In this process, Argentina has received the
short end of the stick. Basic strategic decisions are taken in Brazil by the same corporations that
operate in Argentina. These decisions imply a persistent foreign exchange deficit, since exports to
Brazil are far lower than Argentina’s parts and car imports from Brazil. Within an especial trade
regime, created in the early nineties, Argentina’s car industry operates as an appendix of a cycle of
capital that is led in the neighbor country. The size and importance of the automobile industry is
such  that  Argentina’s  manufacturing  complex  as  a  whole  is  dominated  by  Brazilian  needs  for
valorization, with little or no autonomy whatsoever. The ties with China, on the contrary, tend to
replicate historical dependent articulation but with a twist (Slipak 2012). Argentina has become a
significant provider of primary products (e.g., Soya) and some agricultural manufactures (such as
Soya flour and oil)  for China.  On the contrary,  China has become one of the main sources  of
industrial manufactures for Argentina’s cycle of capital. This trade reproduces traditional unequal
exchange but  in  a  new setting.  Capitalist  China  competes  not  only  on  the  bases  of  increasing
productivity of labour but also on the bases of relatively low wages and poor working conditions.
This creates for Argentina’s manufacturing capital an additional pressure in competition, pressure
that is released on the working people as increased need for super exploitation as a means for
competitiveness.
These forms of dependency illustrate the role that Argentina has gained, through the action of
the new hegemonic fractions  of capital,  in the world market.  As part  of the global  commodity
chains, Argentina’s cycle of capital has been set to occupy a place as provider of raw materials or
some of its basic manufactures. This is yet another structural limit of neodevelopmentalism for
Argentina’s reindustrialization is bounded by a new place in the structure of dependency. Before the
neoliberal era,  local  industrialization was made possible within the framework of a  fragmented
world market, partial international circulation of capital and a strong laboring class movement that
in Argentina forced a relative improvement in living conditions (Féliz and Pérez 2004). This meant
that  dependency  and  its  resulting  processes  (e.g.,  super  exploitation  of  labour)  were  mediated
through class struggle to allow for a particular form of peripheral industrialization (the so-called
model of import substitution,  in  the time of classic developmentalism).  On the contrary,  in the
current era, as transnationalization of local capital has come to dominate and become hegemonic,
local  processes  of  accumulation  and investment  have  become increasingly  subordinated  to  the
global  needs  of  such  agents.  The  hegemonic  victory  of  transnational  corporations,  radicalized
through the irruption of Chinese capitals, has left Argentina’s capitalism in an awkward position.
While  neodevelopmentalism  has  gained  ideological  support  as  a  means  to  condense  social
contradictions  and—in  conflict—normalize  social  demands,  it  has  lost  its  ideal  social  agent  for
development and change, the national local bourgeoisie (Féliz 2012b). In fact, the newly founded
dominant agent (transnationalized capital) cannot—by social constitution—promote the autonomous
capitalist development process that developmentalism so eagerly awaits. This is the result of at least
three concurrent  elements.  On the  one hand,  the  prevalence  of  extraordinary  rents  cuts  off  the
incentive for local productive reinvestment and accumulation of surplus value. Since the production
of rents do not depend on reinvesting the extraordinary profitability, a sizable fraction of surplus
value can be circulated to be used elsewhere, instead of being reinvested (Manzanelli 2011). In the
case of transnational corporations, displacing surplus profits can operate neatly through the internal
exchanges within each capital (e.g., intra-firm trade, capital flight, etc.), making it harder for it to be
redistributed through State action. Secondly, since capitals accruing rent operate as part of global
enterprises  reinvestment  of  surplus  value  is  conditioned  on  its  world-wide  strategy.  Since  that
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strategy recognizes the current international division of labour, Argentina does not have a place
there as a center for manufacturing production. Thus, dominant fractions of local capital fail to
concentrate their accumulation within this value-space, reinvesting only in as much as is required
for the recreation of conditions for production and appropriation of rent. Finally, since dominant
fractions of capital have been able to locate Argentina as a source of super exploitation of labour,
the domestic market for consumption has limited scope and any additional demand for popular
consumption tends to be satisfied through imports or displaced through inflationary means.
V. Preliminary Conclusions
New dependency is the premise and the conclusion of the process of transition from neoliberal rule
into neodevelopmentalism. As neoliberalism collapsed into an organic crisis, emerging hegemonic
fractions of capital had already been able to create the social bases for a new successful process of
valorization and accumulation to take place. New modalities of super exploitation of labour and
nature create the objective bases for production of surplus value and surplus profitability.
As the neodevelopmentalist project constitutes in a new form of the State, changes in class
composition and social division of capital set the pace for a new way in which Argentina’s economy
occupies a link in the cycle of global capital. From this new position, local transnationalized capital
can provide both use values and surplus value that enable Argentina to act as a “successful” partner
for capital within the world market.
Through neoliberalism, BTC were able to create the social, political and economic bases for
this  new  place  within  dependency  relationships  to  take  place.  The  so-called  “regressive
restructuration”  of  Argentina’s  economy forced a  new political  constitution  of  labor  that  made
extensive super exploitation viable. Besides, it created a wide array of changes in the social and
productive structure of capital to make the most of super exploitation of nature. Both changes were
made possible through a changing form of dependency that reconfigured the global ties of the local
cycle  of  capital,  making  the  most  of  the  new  composition  of  capital  and  labour  in  terms  of
production, appropriation and use of value produced.
The  aforementioned  transformations  where  not  an  imposition  from  abroad  or  the  mere
“logical”  result  of  the  neoliberal  age,  but  the  fought  over  result  of  historical  class  conflict  in
Argentina. As a matter of fact, the nature of changes resulted from the defeat of labour in the battle
for development. Neoliberal outfall was the conclusion of the strategic success of new hegemonic
fractions within the dominant social agent (e.g., capital). The first traces of the neodevelopmentalist
decade came as the forefront of this strategic success. However, the new hegemonic project had to
take  into  account  and  partially  include  the  renewed  forces  a  changed  political  composition  of
labour.  The  need  to  channel  these  forces  into  a  viable  capitalist  program  explain  most
transformations at the level of the State.
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